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Basic economic theory predicts that a consumer’s willingness to pay for a good is affected by the
availability of complements and substitutes. In an auction setting, this theory implies that the presence
of complements would increase bid prices for a good, while the presence of substitutes would decrease
bid prices for a good. We designed an experiment that allows the calculation of inverse elasticities,
the inverse-demand equivalent of conventional price elasticities. Our results show that the availability
of complements and substitutes affects bids in the expected directions. This finding has important
implications for researchers who design experimental auctions.
Selon la th´ eorie ´ economique de base, la volont´ e de payer d’un consommateur pour obtenir un bien est
influenc´ ee par la disponibilit´ e de compl´ ements et desubstituts.Dans unsc´ enario de vente aux ench` eres,
cette th´ eorie implique que la pr´ esence de compl´ ements ferait augmenter le prix offert pour un bien,
tandis que la pr´ esence de substituts ferait diminuer le prix offert. Nous avons conc ¸u une exp´ erience
qui a permis de calculer les ´ elasticit´ es inverses, l’´ equivalent de la demande inverse des ´ elasticit´ es-prix
classiques. Nos r´ esultats ont montr´ e que la disponibilit´ e de compl´ ements et de substituts influence les
offres d’achat dans les directions pr´ evues. Cette observation a d’importantes r´ epercussions pour les
chercheurs qui conc ¸oivent des ventes aux ench` eres exp´ erimentales.
INTRODUCTION
One of economic theory’s basic predictions is that consumer demand is affected by the
availability of substitutes or complements. In the context of auctions, this prediction
implies that the bids submitted for a good should increase when auction participants
also have the chance to win a complementary good, and that these bids should decrease
when they also have the chance to win a substitute good. But, depending on the cir-
cumstances, researchers who use experimental auctions in consumer demand studies may
only be interested in estimating the value of a good in isolation and, therefore, wish to
avoid the confounding effects introduced by complements and substitutes. Experimental
economists have used several methods when collecting bids on multiple products. Many
researchers eliciting bids for several related products have done so with the understanding
that only one of the products being bid on will actually be sold (e.g., Roosen et al 1998;
Rousuetal2005).Analternativesomeresearchershaveusedisallowingforthepossibility
that a participant may win more than one good, being careful to make sure that those
Canadian Journal of Agricultural Economics 56 (2008) 179–194
179180 CANADIAN JOURNAL OF AGRICULTURAL ECONOMICS
goods are unrelated (e.g., Rousu et al 2004). Yet another alternative is to allow partici-
pants to win multiple goods that are clearly complements or substitutes for one another
(e.g., Hoffman et al 1993; Noussair et al 2002; Umberger et al 2002; Noussair et al 2004).
This diversity in methodology underscores the importance of better understanding the
role complements and substitutes play in the experimental marketplace.
Although economic theory predicts experimental auction participants will change
their bids in the presence of complements or substitutes, we know of only one experi-
mental study that has addressed this issue. List and Lucking-Reiley (2000) examine sales
of multiple units that were identical (i.e., perfect substitutes) and find that consumers
participating in a demand-revealing multiunit Groves-Clark auction on average submit
lower bids for the second unit than for the first. However, no research has examined the
impact of selling complements or nonidentical substitutes on bids submitted in experi-
mental auctions. This lack of emphasis on complements and substitutes is likely due in
part to experimental economists’ neglect of (inverse) elasticities. One of the most com-
mon methods that researchers use to determine whether products are complements or
substitutes is the examination of the cross-price elasticity coefficients.
This paper contributes to the literature in two important ways. First, we use a
demand-revealing experimental design for auctions of three commonly consumed food
products to test if consumers change their bidding behavior when they may win multiple
products that are complements or substitutes. Second, to assist in estimating the effects
of complements and substitutes, our experimental design allows us to estimate inverse
elasticities (also known as demand flexibilities). To our knowledge, this is the first paper
to estimate inverse elasticities using experimental auctions. We estimate these inverse
elasticities using a logarithmic specification. Given the fundamental role of elasticities in
economic analysis, we hope this paper will help expand the use of inverse elasticities in
experimental auctions. Given the explosion of experimental auctions that sell multiple
products, this paper provides timely insight into an issue that experimental economists
often overlook.
EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN
Participants bid on combinations of the following three food products in a series of
25 rounds: a 16-ounce jar of salsa, an 8-ounce bag of plain-labeled tortilla chips, and an
8-ounce bag of tortilla chips labeled “Made in America from American Ingredients.” We
chose these specific products because we believed it was likely that the participants would
be familiar with them and, therefore, have a reasonable idea of the products’ value before
bidding. The labels were basic to avoid the potential of a label’s design affecting bids
and confounding our results. By having participants bid in an auction where goods are
actually purchased by the winning bidders rather than collecting information on stated
willingness to pay (WTP) from a hypothetical survey, participants face greater incentives
to accurately reveal their preferences.
We used two different auction mechanisms that are widely used in the literature,
both of which are demand revealing (i.e., bidding one’s true value is a weakly dominant
strategy). In the first treatment, participants bid on goods using the second-price, sealed-
bid auction (Vickrey 1961). In the second treatment, participants bid on goods using the
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participant submits a sealed bid for a product. The auction monitor sorts the bids from
highest to lowest, and the highest bidder wins the auction and pays the second highest
bid price for the product. The random nth-price auction differs only in that the monitor
randomly selects a number between 2 and N (where N is the number of participants), and
the bid price corresponding to that number becomes the nth price. The n − 1 bidders who
submitted bids higher than the nth price then purchase the product paying the randomly
selected nth price.1
The rationale behind both mechanisms is that bidders have incentives to truthfully
reveal their WTP because the amount they bid has been separated from the amount they
would pay to purchase the product if they are a winning bidder. Therefore, they do not
have incentives to underbid their actual valuation to reduce the price paid if they are the
winning bidder. Neither do they have incentives to overbid and risk winning the product
at a higher price than their private valuation. However, in a second-price auction, low-
value bidders who never expect to win may become disengaged and may not truthfully
reveal their WTP. With the random nth-price mechanism, every bidder has a chance
of winning in every round and faces incentives to bid truthfully regardless of his/her
valuation. Thus, random nth-price auctions offer advantages for ascertaining individual
WTP when bidders know their WTP is far below the market-clearing price (Shogren
et al 2001). Because the choice of auction mechanism has been found to affect bidding
behavior (Lusk et al 2004), we varied the auction mechanism to examine the effects on
bids.
These auction mechanisms were implemented following standard experimental auc-
tion protocols (e.g., Shogren et al 1994) that help ensure participants understand pro-
cedures, remain engaged in the experiment, and truthfully reveal information. Although
we followed standard experimental auction protocols for second-price and nth-price auc-
tions, we made several refinements to enhance our experimental design. First, we did
not post market prices for products, because recent evidence indicates that experimental
participants can be influenced by a “posted-price” effect (Corrigan and Rousu 2006b).
Second, we randomized the order of the rounds across participants. Doing so ensured
that the order of bidding did not systematically influence our results.2 Third, we sold
multiple units of multiple commodities across rounds, thus allowing us to estimate in-
verse elasticities. Finally, to ensure that our results were not an artifact of the auction
mechanism used, we varied the auction mechanism across treatments. This allowed us to
test whether the results depended on the auction mechanism used.
Ninety-four undergraduate students took part in this study.3 All of these stu-
dents were enrolled in Principles of Economics courses at Iowa State University. Al-
though this sample was relatively homogenous, some demographic differences across
participants could potentially affect their bids. These characteristics are summarized in
Table 1.
When participants arrived at the experiment, they completed a consent form and
were paid $5 for participating.4 Each participant was also assigned an I.D. number to
maintain anonymity. All bid sheets included this I.D. number, so participants’ identities
would not be revealed in the session. Participants were given both printed and oral
instructions on the auction mechanism to be used in that treatment, either the second-
price auction or the random nth-price auction. Participants were told that, although they
were submitting bids in multiple rounds, only one of those rounds would be randomly182 CANADIAN JOURNAL OF AGRICULTURAL ECONOMICS
Table 1. Characteristics of the participants
Variable Definition Mean SD
Gender = 1 if female 0.44 0.50
Income Monthly cash after living expenses $233 205
Race: White = 1 if participant is white 0.70 0.55
GPA Cumulative grade point average of student 3.14 1.39
chosen as binding. The random selection of only one round as binding is done to allow
collection of bids under a variety of product combinations, while avoiding introduction
of complicating factors related to participants adjusting their bids to account for the
possibility of winning multiple rounds. After reading and hearing the instructions, study
participants were given a short quiz on the details of the auction mechanism. They then
took part in a series of three practice auctions for various combinations of two types
of candy bars. The quiz and practice rounds were designed to ensure that participants
understood both the auction mechanism and the format of the upcoming rounds.
After the practice rounds, participants were given the chance to examine the three
food products for sale in the auction. Although participants bid on these products in
a series of 25 potentially binding rounds, six of these rounds were designed to explore
a separate research question and were not used in the current analysis.5 In each of the
19 rounds relevant to our analysis, participants bid on various combinations of the
three food products as shown in Table 2. Specifically, they bid on one unit of each
product individually, two units of each product individually, and three units of each
product individually, as well as different combinations of multiple products. Structuring
the experiment in this way allowed us to obtain own-price inverse elasticities, because
participants bid on more than one unit of each product. We can also obtain cross-price
inverse elasticities, because participants bid on combinations of different products.
After the bidding was completed, the monitor announced the binding round. Next,
the auction winners were determined, and any transactions agreed to were carried out.
Finally,allparticipantscompletedaquestionnaireelicitingbackgroundanddemographic
information, which concluded the experiment.
ECONOMETRIC MODEL
Participantsinourauctionsbidonmultiplecombinationsofthethreeproducts.Toexam-
ine preferences for these products, we first needed to determine the marginal valuations
(i.e., WTP) for each additional individual item. When only one unit of a product was
available, this task was trivial because we could simply use the bid price submitted. To
obtain the marginal valuation for the second unit, we took a participant’s total bid for
two units and subtracted his bid for one unit of the product.6 We used a similar process to
determine the marginal valuation for the third unit of the commodity. For rounds where
multiple products were available and one of them had multiple units, the marginal valua-
tionforunitsafterthefirstwascalculatedbysubtractingthebidforthesamecombination
of products with one fewer unit of the good. For instance, the marginal value of a second
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Table 2. The rounds of bidding
Quantity of Quantity of Quantity










10 1 1 0
11 1 0 1
12 0 1 1
13 2 1 0
14 2 0 1
15 0 2 1
16 1 2 0
17 0 1 2
18 1 0 2
19 1 1 1
subtracting the bid for one unit of tortilla chips with one unit of salsa. Although all total
bids were constrained to be nonnegative, it is possible for a participant’s marginal valua-
tionforunitsafterthefirsttobenegativeiftheybidlessforabundlewithmoreunits.(For
example, in our experiment, students may not have wanted to carry multiple jars of salsa
aroundcampusand,therefore,mayhavevaluedthreejarsofsalsaasbeingworthlessthan
two jars of salsa.) For American-labeled tortilla chips, plain-labeled tortilla chips, and
salsa, there were 10 out of 890, 8 out of 890, and 20 out of 890 observations, respectively,
where the marginal valuations were negative.
In most competitive markets, quantity demanded by an individual consumer can
reasonably be characterized as a function of price (among other explanatory variables),
that is, consumers face a fixed market equilibrium price and must then determine the
quantity they are willing to purchase at that price. In an auction framework, however,
price is a function of quantity, given that participants face a fixed quantity available
for purchase and must then determine the price they are willing to pay. Because of this
feature, we estimate the inverse demand for these products. Thus, our measures of price
responsiveness are inverse elasticities rather than elasticities. Inverse elasticities measure
the responsiveness of consumers’ marginal valuations to changes in the quantity avail-
able and are analogous to the more familiar price-elasticity measures used in analyzing
conventional demand curves.
The marginal valuations for each of the three products are hypothesized to be
dependent on the quantity of the product available and the presence and quantity of184 CANADIAN JOURNAL OF AGRICULTURAL ECONOMICS
complementary or substitutable products. We estimate our models using a log–log speci-
fication.7 In the case of plain-labeled tortilla chips, the model estimated was
lnWTP
ij
pln = αi + βpln ln Q
j
pln + βusa ln Qj
usa + βsal ln Q
j
sal + γ Xi + εij (1)
where WTP
ij
pln is participant i’s marginal WTP for plain-labeled tortilla chips as part of
bundle j,t h eQ variables are the quantities of each product available in bundle j,t h e
βs are the corresponding coefficients, Xi is a vector of demographic characteristics, γ
is the corresponding vector of coefficients, and εij is the random error term. Here, the
pln subscript refers to plain-labeled tortilla chips, the usa subscript refers to American-
labeled tortilla chips, and the sal subscript refers to salsa. The equations for the other two
products are defined analogously.
An advantage to using logarithmic models when estimating demand equations is
that the coefficients represent elasticities. In addition, we expect marginal valuations to
be declining with quantity available. However, the natural log of a zero marginal value is
undefined. Thus, values of zero were replaced with a very small positive value of 1/100th
of a penny ($0.0001).8 In addition, when one of the complementary or substitutable
products was not available to be bid on (i.e., zero quantity available), we replaced the zero
quantities with 0.0001.
In only one of the 19 rounds were all three products available in positive quantities.
To accurately estimate the own marginal WTP for each of the products as shown in
Equation (1), rounds where the quantity of the own good was zero were not used in
estimation. For example, in estimating the equation for marginal WTP for salsa, we only
use the observations where there were one, two, or three units of salsa available, not the
observations where zero units of salsa were available.9 For each equation, there are 10
observations for each participant; therefore, we estimated each demand equation using a
random effects model to account for unobserved heterogeneity.10
RESULTS
To better understand the impact complements and substitutes have on bidding behavior,
we discuss both findings based on summary statistics and tests of bidder behavior as well
as the results of our regression models. Summary statistics for marginal valuations for the
products are shown in Table 3. As noted above, negative marginal valuations are possible
if bidders reduce their (nonnegative) total bids for a bundle of a product when the units
of the product increase. To better understand how the availability of complements and
substitutes could affect marginal valuations, consider Equation (2), which would hold in
the absence of complements or substitutes or a binding budget constraint:
Bid(A) + Bid(B) = Bid(A + B)( 2 )
According to Equation (2), if participants place separate bids on products A and B
(when they know they cannot win both products), the sum of their bids to purchase both
products individually should equal their bid to purchase both products A and B together
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Table 3. Mean bids (N = 94)
Standard
Product(s) Mean Median deviation Minimum Maximum
Part A: Bids for 1, 2, and 3 units of each commodity
First bag of plain-labeled
tortilla chips
$0.51 0.28 0.51 0.00 2.00
Second bag of plain-labeled
tortilla chips
$0.45 0.25 0.50 0.00 2.00
Third bag of plain-labeled
tortilla chips
$0.40 0.25 0.77 −3.00 5.00
First bag of American-labeled
tortilla chips
$0.58 0.48 0.56 0.00 2.25
Second bag of American-labeled
tortilla chips
$0.52 0.25 0.62 −0.50 2.80
Third bag of American-labeled
tortilla chips
$0.45 0.25 0.65 −3.00 2.30
First jar of salsa $0.65 0.50 0.57 0.00 2.30
Second jar of salsa $0.55 0.36 0.62 −0.20 2.50
Third jar of salsa $0.40 0.25 0.70 −2.50 2.01
Part B: Bids for combinations of 2 items
1 bag of plain-labeled tortilla
chips and
1 bag of American-labeled
tortilla chips
1.03 0.95 0.95 0 4.25
1 bag of plain-labeled tortilla
chips and
1 jar of salsa
1.24 1.00 1.10 0 5.50
1 bag of American-labeled
tortilla chips
and 1 jar of salsa
1.31 1.00 1.08 0 5.00
are complements, economic theory predicts that the right-hand side of Equation (2) will
be greater than the left-hand side. When the products are substitutes (including perfect
substitutes,thatis,multipleunitsofthesameproduct),theorypredictsthattheright-hand
side of Equation (2) will be less than the left-hand side.
As shown in Table 3, the mean marginal valuation for each of the three products
declines with the number of units available, as expected. Table 4 compares the sum of the
individual bids for two products with the bids for the pair of products sold together. This
comparison allows us to test Equation (2) and provides insight into how bidding behavior
changes in the presence of complements or substitutes.
When the two products sold are complements, the bid for the pair of items when sold
together is greater than the sum of the bids for each item individually. A one-sided t-test
shows that these results are statistically significant at the 0.01 level for the American-
labeled tortilla chips and salsa and are statistically significant at the 0.04 level for the
plain-labeled tortilla chips and salsa.11 In the case where the two products are substitutes
(thetwodifferenttypesoftortillachips),thebidforthepairofproductswhensoldtogether
is smaller than the sum of the bids for each item individually. This result is statistically186 CANADIAN JOURNAL OF AGRICULTURAL ECONOMICS
Table 4. How do bids change in bundles of complements or substitutes? The value is the bid for
the bundle of goods minus the sum of the individual bids for the products (N = 94)
Products Mean deviation
Plain-labeled tortilla chips and jar of salsa 0.09∗
Standard deviation (0.58)
American-labeled tortilla chips and jar of salsa 0.16∗∗
Standard deviation (0.57)
Plain-labeled tortilla chips and American-labeled tortilla chips −0.06∗∗
Standard deviation (0.30)
∗Statistically significant at the 0.05 level using a one-sided t-test.
∗∗Statistically significant at the 0.01 level using a one-sided t-test.
Table 5. Random effects model: Logarithmic specification
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Intercept −1.61∗∗ 0.91 1.09 0.69
(0.30) (1.55) (1.62) (1.64)
Log (quantity of plain-labeled tortilla chips) −0.88∗∗ −0.88∗∗ −0.88∗∗ −0.88∗∗
(0.16) (0.16) (0.16) (0.16)
Log (quantity of American-labeled tortilla chips) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Log (quantity of salsa) 0.06∗∗ 0.06∗∗ 0.06∗∗ 0.06∗∗
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Female 0.13 0.14 0.04
(0.57) (0.57) (0.58)
Race: White −1.40∗ −1.42∗ −1.69∗∗
(0.60) (0.61) (0.64)






Note: Numbers in parentheses are standard errors.
∗Statistically significant at the 0.05 level.
∗∗Statistically significant at the 0.01 level.
Dependent variable: Log of bid price for plain-labeled tortilla chips (N = 890).
significant at the 0.05 level using a one-sided t-test (at the 0.01 level using a one-sided
Wilcoxon sign-rank test). Our results show that both complementary and substitutable
products affect consumer bids in a way that is consistent with economic theory. Further,
more than 44% of participants altered their marginal valuations of individual products
when multiple products were available as part of the bundle auctioned. These results have
implications for researchers who wish to use experimental auctions to estimate the valueTHE EFFECTS OF SELLING COMPLEMENTS AND SUBSTITUTES ON CONSUMER WILLINGNESS TO PAY 187
Table 6. Random effects model: Logarithmic specification
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Intercept −1.45∗∗ 0.52 0.61 0.32
(0.28) (1.43) (1.50) (1.52)
Log (quantity of plain-labeled tortilla chips) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Log (quantity of American-labeled −0.82∗∗ −0.82∗∗ −0.82∗∗ −0.82∗∗
tortilla tortilla chips) (0.16) (0.16) (0.16) (0.16)
Log (quantity of salsa) 0.06∗∗ 0.06∗∗ 0.06∗∗ 0.06∗∗
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Female 0.02 0.03 −0.04
(0.53) (0.53) (0.54)
Race: White −1.01 −1.02 −1.22∗
(0.56) (0.56) (0.59)






Note: Numbers in parentheses are standard errors.
∗Statistically significant at the 0.05 level.
∗∗Statistically significant at the 0.01 level.
Dependent variable: Log of bid price for American-labeled tortilla chips (N = 890).
of multiple goods. With a large percentage of participants changing their valuations in
the presence of complements or substitutes, researchers who sell related products in an
experimental auction run the risk of biasing their results either upward or downward.
The results of our conditional models are shown in Tables 5–7. Table 5 shows the
resultsoftheregressionexaminingthebidpriceforthebagofplain-labeledtortillachips.12
The coefficients for the log of the quantities available are of most interest in this analysis
because these coefficients are the inverse elasticities. The demographic variables included
were not significant other than a dummy variable for white participants, who had lower
marginal valuations than those who were nonwhite. This is driven, in part, by greater
bids for tortilla chips from Hispanic participants. The own-quantity inverse elasticity is
approximately −1.1, which indicates that a 10% increase in the quantity of tortilla chips
available would cause consumers to bid approximately 11% less.
The cross-quantity inverse elasticities show how a change in the quantity available
of American-labeled tortilla chips or salsa changes the bid price for plain-labeled tortilla
chips. The cross-quantity inverse elasticity for American-labeled tortilla chips is approx-
imately zero. The cross-quantity inverse elasticity for salsa on the price of plain-labeled
tortilla chips is small, 0.06, but is statistically significant. This relationship indicates that
a 10% increase in the availability of salsa would yield a 0.6% increase in the bid price
for plain-labeled tortilla chips, thereby indicating that the consumers in the experiment
considered tortilla chips and salsa complements, as expected.188 CANADIAN JOURNAL OF AGRICULTURAL ECONOMICS
Table 7. Random effects model: Logarithmic specification
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Intercept −1.23∗∗ 0.53 0.31 0.46
(0.28) (1.43) (1.50) (1.53)
Log (quantity of plain-labeled tortilla chips) 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Log (quantity of American-labeled tortilla chips) 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Log (quantity of salsa) −1.52∗∗ −1.52∗∗ −1.52∗∗ −1.52∗∗
(0.18) (0.18) (0.18) (0.18)
Female −0.53 −0.54 −0.54
(0.53) (0.53) (0.54)
Race: White −0.96 −0.94 −0.93
(0.56) (0.56) (0.60)






Note: Numbers in parentheses are standard errors.
∗Statistically significant at the 0.05 level.
∗∗Statistically significant at the 0.01 level.
Dependent variable: Log of bid price for salsa (N = 890).
Tables6and7showthedemandsfortheAmerican-labeledtortillachipsandthejarof
salsa, respectively. The own-quantity inverse elasticity for American-labeled tortilla chips
iscloseto−1,whiletheown-quantityinverseelasticityforthejarofsalsaisapproximately
−2, indicating that the price participants would pay diminishes rapidly with an increase
in the quantity sold. This demonstrates that consumer valuation is more sensitive to
the quantity of salsa available than it is for tortilla chips. The cross-quantity inverse
elasticities for American-labeled tortilla chips are similar to those for the plain-labeled
tortilla chips, in that the cross-elasticities for the American-labeled tortilla chips and the
jar of salsa are small but display the expected complementary relationship.13 None of
the participant characteristics had a statistically significant effect on valuations for either
American-labeled tortilla chips or salsa.
CONCLUSION AND SIGNIFICANCE
Despite the common use of elasticity estimates in applied economic analysis, experimen-
tal auctions are not usually constructed in such a way that meaningful inverse elasticities
can be estimated. This paper reports the results of an experimental auction designed to
estimate inverse elasticities. We use a log–log specification to estimate WTP and gen-
erate inverse elasticities. The estimated inverse elasticities confirmed our unconditional
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complement and bid less when also bidding on a substitute. These findings suggest that
value estimates from auctions where participants could possibly win multiple substitute
goodsmayunderstatethegoods’valuesinisolation.Similarly,auctionswhereparticipants
could win multiple goods that are complements may overstate WTP for the individual
goods.
These results have implications for the design of experimental auctions. Researchers
who are examining consumer demand for new products should be conscious of the effect
ofcomplementaryorsubstitutablegoodsondemandwhenconductingpremarkettests.In
addition, researchers who wish to sell multiple goods should either attempt to ensure that
the goods are neither complements nor substitutes (e.g., Huffman et al 2003) or should
explicitly account for these relationships in auction design. For instance, one method is to
collectbidsonmultipleproductsindifferentauctionroundsandthenrandomlyselectone
binding round (e.g., Roosen et al 1998) so that these relationships can be estimated from
the multiple rounds of bids submitted. Future research to address how best to estimate
demandinthepresenceofcomplementsorsubstitutesiswarranted.Also,whilethispaper
presents an exploratory attempt at estimating inverse elasticities, much more work could
bedonewithalternativeexperimentaldesignstoallowforestimationofinverseelasticities
using alternative WTP specifications.
NOTES
1The complete set of instructions given to the participants is available from the authors upon
request.
2For evidence on how ordering matters in experimental auctions, see Huffman et al (2003).
3While 94 students volunteered to participate, only 90 submitted bids in all auction rounds.
4Participants were not restricted to using only this $5 for purchasing products in the auction, but
only six participants placed bids that were greater than $5. Participants were only restricted to
placing nonnegative bids.
5In the other six rounds, participants bid to “upgrade” from one unit of a product to two units,
or from two units to three units. Results from these rounds are reported in Corrigan and Rousu
(2006a). This research examined how endowments affect bids in experimental auctions. We varied
the order of the endowment and nonendowment rounds across participants to randomize any
potential ordering effects.
6Note that in rounds where participants bid on a bundle containing more than one type of product,
they wrote down separate WTP figures for each type of product, then summed these to get their
total WTP for the bundle. It was this total WTP that was used to determine who won the auction.
7We also estimated models using linear specification and a dummy-variable specification (i.e., using
dummy variables to represent the presence or absence of a 1st, 2nd, or 3rd unit of the each good),
both of which generated qualitatively similar results. Results for these alternative specifications can
be obtained from the authors.
8We also ran regressions with zero bid prices estimated at 0.001 (higher) and 0.00001 (lower). The
results were qualitatively similar to the results we report in this paper.
9We could have estimated a “choke price” (i.e., the price at which quantity demanded would be
zero) and then used all observations. But, because the choke price would have been estimated by
the regressions shown in Equations (1) through (3), we saw no advantages to using that method.
10We also ran a fixed effects model and found the same qualitative results, which are available from
the authors upon request. A Hausman test indicated no significant differences between the fixed
and random effects models (Hausman and Taylor 1981).190 CANADIAN JOURNAL OF AGRICULTURAL ECONOMICS
11A nonparametric Wilcoxon sign-rank test yields similar results, with results significant at the 0.01
and 0.06 levels, respectively.
12Recall that we used different auction mechanisms for different participants. Unconditional tests
could not reject the null hypothesis that there was no difference between the bids from participants
using the second- and nth-price auction mechanisms. Because the treatments were independent of
one another and the bids did not differ significantly, we pooled the data across auction mechanisms
for our unconditional statistical tests.
13Asmentionedearlier,wealsoestimatedinverseelasticitiesusingadummyvariableWTPspecifica-
tion. While these elasticity estimates were of the expected sign, in general they were not significantly
different from zero.
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APPENDIX: CONDENSED INSTRUCTION PACKET GIVEN
TO PARTICIPANTS
Welcome! Thank you for choosing to participate in an experiment about economic de-
cision making. In this folder is a packet of information that you will need during the
experiment. Once you have looked at a form during the experiment, feel free to go back
and examine that form again if need be, but please do not look ahead.
It is very important that you follow the instructions carefully. Also, to ensure accu-
racy, please do not talk to or try to communicate with other participants.
I would like to emphasize that all information obtained today will be used only for
group comparisons. No individual information will be divulged for any reason.
Today wewillbeconductingauctionsforsomecommonfoodproducts.Inamoment
we will give you detailed instructions on how the auctions will work.
You have been paid $5.00 for participating in this experiment. That money is yours
to do with as you please. If you like, you can keep it and take it home with you at the
end of the experiment. You will also be given the chance to spend a portion of it on food
items for sale in the auctions we are about to conduct.
Because we are trying to determine values for different products, we again ask that
you do not communicate with other participants. If you have any questions, please raise
your hand and a monitor will come to you.
How the Auction Works
Today we will be using what is known as a “2nd price auction.” The auction will have
four steps:
Step 1 You will be given a chance to inspect the item or items being auctioned off.
Step 2 Each of you will submit a bid by writing your bid on your bid record sheet.
Step 3 The monitor will collect the bids and rank them from highest to lowest.
Step 4 The person who submits the highest bid “wins” the auction and buys the goods
at the second highest price submitted. In the case of a tie, the winner will be
selected at random.
A simple example will help to clarify things. Suppose 10 people (Person A, Person B,
Person C, ..., Person J) are bidding to buy a front row ticket to next season’s Iowa-Iowa











The monitor collects these bids and ranks them from highest to lowest:









Person F—$1.42 lowest bid
Person C is the highest bidder, so she wins the auction and pays the second highest price
in exchange for the ticket. In this case, she buys a ticket for $98.00.
In this type of auction, it is always in your best interest to bid exactly what the item
being auctioned off is worth to you. You do not want to bid more than your true value
because the second highest price might turn out to be more than you are willing to pay
for the item. What may not be so obvious is that you do not gain by bidding less than the
most you are willing to pay. This is because the winner generally does not pay the amount
that he or she bid, but instead pays the price submitted by the second highest bidder.
Short Quiz on Auction Format
Please complete the following quiz to make sure that you understand the auction format
we will be using. The quiz will not be collected. Instead, the monitor will explain the
answers once everyone has finished.
1. The winner of an auction will always have to pay what he or she bid.
a. True
b. False
2. If you have the second highest bid, you win the auction.
a. True
b. False





by the second highest bidder.
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5. In this type of auction, it is always in your best interest to bid the maximum amount




These two rounds will not count, but will serve to illustrate how we will be holding the
auction.
Please come to the front of the room to examine the two candy bars available in this
auction.
There are two trial rounds, but only one would count, that is only one of the two
would be chosen as a binding (valid) round. This will be chosen after you bid in the two
rounds.
On the practice bid sheet on the next page, please place a bid for the Nestle Crunch
bar in trial round 1.
For trial round 2, please place a bid for both the Nestle Crunch bar and the But-
terfinger bar. We ask that you determine the price you would pay for each—by writing
the prices next to the good in the shaded area. Then add up the totals in the shaded boxes.
This is your total bid for the two products that will be used to compute the bids, should
this be the binding (valid) round.
In trial round 3, you are endowed with (given) a Nestle Crunch bar. You are bidding
to go from a Nestle Crunch bar to both a Nestle Crunch bar and a Butterfinger candy
bar.
On the practice bid sheet on the next page, please place a bid to upgrade the Nestle
Crunch bar to both a Butterfinger and a Nestle Crunch bar candy bar.
Now that bids for all the practice trials have been placed, the monitor will pick up
all of the practice trial bid sheets.
Onceallthebidsheetsarecollected,themonitorwillselectwhichofthethreepractice
rounds would be the binding round.
Then, the monitor will write down the highest bids. The highest bidder would win
the auction, and pay the 2nd highest price.
Please notice the following two things: (1) Your bid cannot affect the price you will
pay if you win the auction. (2) It is in your best interest to bid your true value.
Instructions—Bidding Part 1
Today you will be bidding on three different food items shown at the front of the room.
Pleasetakeafewmomentstocometothefrontoftheroomtoexaminethethreeproducts
that you will be bidding on in the auctions.
You will be bidding on the three goods, tortilla chips, tortilla chips that are “Made in
America,” and salsa in various combinations. For example, in one of the trials, you will
be bidding on two bags of “Made in America” tortilla chips, while in another round you
will be bidding on one of all three goods.
While there are several trials, only one is going to count as the binding (valid) round.
For the first set of trials, you will be bidding on different combinations of food
products. You will submit your bid by writing it on the appropriate line of the bid from
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Once again, when there is more than one item up for sale, please calculate your total
price by determining your bid price for each of the food products, and then adding those
up into the gray column on the right hand side.
If there are multiple units of the same product, you may just enter in your total price
for those multiple products (for example, if you are bidding in the round for two bags of
tortilla chips, you can enter your total price for the two bags, you do not have to enter in
how much you would pay for each bag).
Please begin bidding on the products in the first set of 19 rounds.
Instructions—Bidding Part 2
The next six rounds are conducted in a slightly different way.
In these rounds, you are endowed with a one unit of one of the goods—and you are
paying to upgrade to multiple units.
For example, in one of the rounds you are endowed with one jar of salsa, and you
are paying to go from that, to one jar of salsa AND 1 bag of “Made in America” tortilla
chips.
Remember only one round in this experiment will count as valid—if it is one of these
six rounds—everybody in the room will be given the one unit of the good listed in the
“YOU ARE GIVEN” column, and the person with the highest bid will upgrade to the
bundle in the third column.
As before, the top bidder will win the auction and pay the second highest price.
Determining the winning round and bidder.
Now that all of the bid sheets are collected, we will determine which round counts as
the binding round.
Now that we have determined the binding round, we will determine who wins the
auction.